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THE FEDERAL APPEALS PROCESS: WHITHER WE
GOEST? THE NEXT FIFTY YEARS
HON. DONALD

P.

LAYt

In 1933, Justice Felix Frankfurter stated that in that year the
United States Supreme Court had received a record 880 petitions for certiorari.' He warned that "the burden of examining
any considerably greater number would be intolerable." 2 We
are now over a half a century later and we have seen the docket
of the Supreme Court swell to nearly 4,500 petitions for certiorari.3 Similarly, the various dockets of both the federal district
courts and the courts of appeals have greatly expanded to
levels way beyond any predictions at that time. We have grown
from forty-five authorized circuit judgeships and 155 authorized district judgeships in 1933 to 156 circuit judgeships and
575 district judgeships today. 4 In the last ten years alone, we
have seen a nearly fifty percent increase overall in the creation
5
of new judgeships in the federal district and circuit courts.
The possibility that in the next fifty years we shall see the
same increases in judicial workload and number of judgeships
as in the last fifty is certainly not beyond our comprehension.
In fact, considering the exponential growth of the federal government in the past century as demonstrated by the increase of
special interest groups, the creation and proliferation of various nontraditional forums, and the increase in the volume of
both national and local laws, it is not unrealistic to imagine an
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. B.A.
1949, J.D. 1951, University of Iowa. Chief Judge Lay wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of his law clerk, Thomas Boyd,J.D. 1987, University of Iowa, in editing this
essay.
1. Frankfurter & Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1933, 48
HARV. L. REV. 238, 262 (1934).
2. Id. at 263.
3. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURT 1988 139 [hereinafter 1988 ANNUAL REPORT].
4. Id.
5.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS 1978 104, 175 (in 1978 there were 97 circuit judgeships,
excluding 46 senior judgeships, and 399 district judgeships, excluding 119 senior
judgeships). See also WALLACE, THE FUTURE OF THE JUDICIARY-AN UPDATE 1-2
(presented to Conference of the Judiciary, Williamsburg, Virginia, March 1985).
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even greater expansion of the number ofjudges and the workload of the courts. Moreover, any statistics relating to this
type of growth in the last fifty years would show even greater
increases in the state judiciary. 6
In a study commissioned by former Chief Justice Warren
Burger, Circuit Judge Clifford Wallace determined that there
will be 289 circuit and 1,037 district judges by the year 2000. 7

This has been the focus of national concern as reflected by
Congress' creation of a federal judgeship committee which will
study projections of the federal courts' workload and make recommendations as to jurisdictional restructuring.8 As with
many other matters involving structural change, substantial decisions relating to the federal judiciary should be delayed until
a more adequate and complete study can be rendered. This is
an area that deserves more than merely one study by a single
commission.
Perhaps the most notable improvement effecting the
Supreme Court has occurred through recent legislation which
provides the Court with discretionary jurisdiction in all areas
where there had been mandatory jurisdiction. 9 This particular
relief did not come quickly. To spare the reader the long history of this proposal, suffice it to say that recommendations to
Congress to eliminate mandatory jurisdiction were first made
over twenty-five years ago and it has taken this long to attain
any substantial achievement. The startling fact relating to this
reform is that there was never any organized opposition to this
proposal. The primary obstacle was simply Congressional
lethargy in an area that affected the court system on a procedural basis. As exemplified by the recent salary debacle, Congress has shown little or no concern for the judiciary as far as
internal effectiveness is concerned.
Attempts to deal with the expanding workload of the federal
courts have bumbled along over the past fifty years with little
concern for long-term planning. Court growth has operated
more or less on the Peter Principle which thrives on problem6. See generally S. WASBY, T. MARVELL & A. AIKMAN, VOLUME AND DELAY IN THE
42-46 (1979); Marvell, State Ap-

STATE APPELLATE COURTS: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES

pellate Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282, 284-85 (1989).
7. See Wallace, Working Paper-Futureof the Judiciary, 94 F.R.D. 225, 228 n.4
(1981).
8. Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988).
9. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1253, 1257 (1988).
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solving through uncontrolled growth. All judges, lawyers, and
indeed the citizenry at large must acknowledge that if we are to
continue in our concept of government by law the judicial
branch must be capable of providing the essential undergirding to that form of government. Consequently, we must
pay heed to these growth projections and begin long term
planning to enable the federal judiciary to continue to serve
this nation and the various interests that it will encounter as
our civilization progresses from one generation to the next.
There cannot be a more appropriate or realistic statement to
describe the state of the federal judicial system at this time
than to say "the future is now." The purpose of this essay is
not so much to discuss new issues as it is to consider some
ideas that have been proposed in the past and to give some
conception of the direction in which the courts should move.
I. THE SUPREME COURT
The undeniable facts are that the United States Supreme
Court functions with the same number of justices that it had
two hundred years ago and generates approximately the same
number of opinions annually that it wrote some fifty years ago.
At the same time, there has been an overwhelming increase in
the number of petitions for certiorari and an awesome upgrading in the sophistication of the matters that come before the
Court for final determination. The Court, from its beginnings,
has undergone a good deal of study and analysis. However,
notwithstanding numerous reports, organized resistance, committees, plans, programs, and proposals, we are still in the debate stage and little or nothing has been done to achieve any
realistic improvement in dealing with the workload of the
Supreme Court. We can understand the difficulty of the
problems of change within the judicial system by examining
this movement to relieve the Supreme Court of its ever increasing workload.
My history of attempts to reform the Supreme Court will
start with the creation of the Freund Committee which was directed by Harvard Law School Professor Paul A. Freund.10
The Freund Committee recommended the creation of a national court of appeals which would sit as an intermediate
10.

FEDERALJUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF

THE SUPREME COURT

(1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 575 (1973).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 2
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

court between the various courts of appeals and the Supreme
Court. In effect, this proposal advocated building a fourth tier
of review."I Without going into the details of the various studies that the Freund Committee undertook, it is enough to say
that many of its proposals were poorly received by members of
the bar and the Supreme Court itself. In fact, a new committee
was subsequently created by Congress to study alternative proposals to relieve the burden of the increasing number of petitions for certiorari. There were various suggestions made
including transfer jurisdiction and reference jurisdiction.
There have also been proposals for the creation of a separate
body that would hear many of these cases or at least make recommendations to the Supreme Court as to what cases it should
accept and hear.
The Congressional study commission, headed by the distinguished senator from Nebraska, Roman Hruska, unanimously
12
recommended the creation of a national court of appeals.
Through the organized efforts of members of the bar and
many jurists, including some of the members of the Supreme
Court, the Hruska Commission's proposals were opposed on
many grounds including basic concerns relating to who might
appoint the court and how the court might function. However,
the principle argument made against a national court of appeals was again that it would simply create a fourth tier in the
federal appellate process, and that it would result in more work
for the Court because it would be possible that petitions for
certiorari could be reviewed twice in the same case.
In recent years, former ChiefJustice Burger has advocated a
variation of the Hruska Commission proposal to create a national court of appeals.13 For the last several years, Justice Byron White has dissented from many denials of certiorari on the
ground that there is a lack of uniformity in decisions made by
the lower federal courts and that there is a need for resolution
of these matters on a national level in order to make the law
more uniform.14 Chief Justice William Rehnquist has also rec11. Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 914 (1983).

12. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,
STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1976) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON REVISION].
13.
14.

Burger, The Time is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. J. 86 (Apr. 1985).
See, e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. Simon, 109 S. Ct. 377, 378 (1988); L.E. Myers
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ommended the study and creation of an intercircuit tribunal
primarily intended to resolve conflicts among the circuits that
relate to statutory questions.' 5 Contemporaneously, a complete study of this issue was done by two New York University
professors who are former Supreme Court law clerks. 16 This
study demonstrated that there was not a sufficient number of
serious conflicts during the 1985 and 1986 Supreme Court
Terms to justify the creation of a national court of appeals. In
any event, the debate goes on and it undoubtedly will be subject to continued attention by the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary.
There are two primary bases upon which a concept for some
form of national court of appeals can find legitimate support.
The first basis concerns the great increase in the number of
petitions for certiorari filed with the Court and the immense
burden it places upon the justices. When we consider the dramatic increase in the past fifty years of the number of certiorari
petitions filed annually, it would seem that the burden has be7
come intolerable just as Justice Frankfurter had predicted.'
Certainly, the number of petitions and the corresponding
workload is deceptive to some extent due to the large volume
of frivolous petitions. In fact, the Court has been able to cope
with this problem without a great decrease in its productivity in
writing opinions by adopting various procedures for screening
and pooling the petitions among the Justices and their law
clerks. Nevertheless greater attention must be given to the
Court's ability to responsibly screen the ever-increasing
number of petitions for certiorari.
One must accept the concept that the determination of the
Co., High Voltage Div. v. Secretary of Labor, 108 S. Ct. 479, 480 (1987); Mulligan v.
Hazard, 476 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1986); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Blanton, 471 U.S. 1007,
1009 (1985); Illinois v. Washington, 469 U.S. 1022, 1024 (1984); International Bhd.
of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 323 v. NLRB, 464 U.S. 950, 951 (1983); Castorr v.
Brundage, 459 U.S. 928, 931 (1982); Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 454 U.S. 1110,
1113 (1981); City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 449 U.S. 1039, 1042 (1980); Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S.
1014, 1015 (1978); Masri v. United States, 434 U.S. 907, 908 (1977); Taylor v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 424 U.S. 948, 949 (1976); DeMarrias v. Poitra, 421 U.S. 934,
936-37 (1975); Bailey v. Weinberger, 419 U.S. 953, 953-54 (1974).
15. Rehnquist, The Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1,
12-14 (1986).
16. Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities:
An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984).
17. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court's own docket must be the responsibility of the
Court and may not be subject to delegation. As Justice William Brennan stated in rebuttal to the recommendation that a
separate institution pass upon the certiorari docket, the jurisdiction of the Court is part of the business of the Court and it
would be an unconstitutional delegation of power to allow a
separate body to determine which cases the Supreme Court
should hear.' 8 I think this is certainly sound doctrine.
The fact nonetheless remains that the increasing volume of
petitions for certiorari, notwithstanding that many of those petitions are frivolous on their face, shall place the Supreme
Court in an "intolerable" situation. While the Court has managed to deal with five-fold growth in the past fifty years, it is
preposterous to believe that it could deal with the same level of
growth in the future. A five-fold increase in the present workload would mean 25,000 petitions for certiorari to review each
year! One might scoff at such a projection as unrealistic. But I
am sure that Justice Frankfurter would also have scoffed at the
idea that during the 1988 Term there would be close to 5,000
petitions for certiorari presented to the Supreme Court. Certainly, at some number we are compelled to find that the workload of the Court has reached its magical limit and some
change has to be made. I believe that this limit has already
been reached.
The second basis upon which the proposal for a national
court of appeals may find support-a basis which has been advocated primarily by Justice White 9-relates to the number of
cases that the Court is capable of hearing and deciding. The
contention is that the Supreme Court does not have the capac18. Brennan, Some Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Workload, 66 JUDICATURE 230,
233-35 (1983). See also Brennan, The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U.
CHI. L. REV. 473, 482 (1973).
19. See COMMISSION ON REVISION, supra note 12, 67 F.R.D. at 401-02. More than

a decade ago, Justice White wrote:
I do not suggest that the Court should have granted certiorari in all of these
cases or that it should review all cases of this kind in the future. The reason
is that we are performing at our full capacity, i.e., we are now extending
plenary review to as many cases as we can adequately consider, decide and
explain by full opinion.... There is no doubt that those concerned with the
coherence of the federal law must carefully consider the various alternatives
available to assure that the appellate system has the capacity to function in
the manner contemplated by the Constitution. As others have already
noted, there is grave doubt that this function is being adequately performed.
Brown Transp. Corp. v. Atcon, Inc., 439 U.S. 1014, 1023-24 (1978) (emphasis in the
original, White, J., dissenting). See also Rehnquist, supra note 15, at 12.
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ity to hear as many important issues of law as they should. As a
result, there are more conflicts existing among the circuits relating to substantive law and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasizes, statutory interpretation. This argument has often
been made in the area of tax law and has echoed from as long
ago as former Harvard Dean and Solicitor General Erwin Gris20
wold's testimony before the Hruska Commission.
There is, of course, a logical appeal to this argument. However, most existing studies tend to refute the proposition that
there are important substantive conflicts that exist on a national level today due to the Supreme Court's inability to resolve a docket overload. 21 Additionally, Justice John Paul
Stevens has stated to me that there has never been an instance
during his tenure where the Court has denied a petition for
certiorari in an important case because it was too busy to hear
it.
I respectfully submit that the reasonableness of the charge
that our highest court is so over-burdened that it cannot hear
important cases depends upon one's philosophical view of the
role of the Supreme Court. Should the Supreme Court serve
as a court of error or should the Court limit its decisions to
important issues and policy questions that affect the nation as a
whole? I think most of us believe that the Court should assume the latter role. On that basis, it is difficult to find many
cases in which certiorari has been sought and which should
have been heard but were not reviewed by the Court. The fact
that certiorari might be denied in given cases does not necessarily mean that the Court has overlooked a serious conflict in
decisions by lower courts. All students of the Supreme Court
know that denial of certiorari can be for many reasons, including jurisdictional and procedural questions as well as the merits themselves. 2 2
20. Indeed, Griswold has championed this particular proposal for more than
forty years. See Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1153
(1944).
21. See, e.g., Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical
Study, 11 Hous. L. REV. 1101 (1974); Casper & Posner, The Caseload of the Supreme
Court: 1975 and 1976 Terms, 1977 S. CT. REV. 87; Estreicher & Sexton, supra note 16;
Goldman, Conflict on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1965-71: A Quantitative Analysis, 42 U.
CIN. L. REV. 635 (1973).
22. Note, The Intercircuit Tribunaland Perceived Conflicts: An Analysis ofJustice White's
Dissents From Denial of CertiorariDuring the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 610, 620
(1987).
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Nevertheless if we return to the projections of the Court's
future workload, there is little doubt that- the concerns
presented by Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist can
come true. The Court will need a greater capacity to decide
important national issues. In evaluating the future it is imperative to recognize that the Court, barring constitutional amendment, 23 is permanently composed of its nine members and
cannot write many more opinions than it writes today. Therefore, there must be either an admission that the Justices are
writing cases that are improperly before the Court and consequently blocking review of more important cases, or a recognition that the number of important cases in which review is
sought will eventually exceed the number of cases that the
Court can hear. I perceive that there is eminent need for
change. Although I have personally opposed the creation of a
national court of appeals in the past, 24 the expanded workload
of the Court and the great burden placed upon each individual
Justice may mandate new ideas of structural change.
There has been opposition to the creation of a national
court of appeals for several reasons. The principle reason,
however, is that most proposals do nothing more than create a
fourth tier in the appellate process. In speaking of the
Supreme Court, Justice Robert Jackson once said, "We are not
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." 25 This is an important axiom to remember
in this discussion.
The proposal for a national court as a high level intermediate to the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals does not
provide it with the same degree of authority that the Supreme
Court enjoys. An intermediate court which simply passes upon
issues with the hope that certain ones will fall out or become
23. See Stern, Remedies for Appellate Overloads: The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE
103, 109-10 (1988) (discusses whether a constitutional amendment would be necessary to expand size of Supreme Court).
24. See Supreme Court Workload: Hearings on H. R. 1968 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the AdministrationofJustice of the HouseJudiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 174-83 (1983); Hearings on S. 3052 Before the Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 901-24 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Hearings
on Federal Court Appellate System]; see also Lay, Query: Will the Proposed National Court of
Appeals Create More Problems than it Solves?, 66JUDICATURE 437 (1983); Lay, Why Rush to
Judgment? Some Second Thoughts on the Proposed NationalCourt of Appeals, 59 JUDICATURE
172 (1975).
25. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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more authoritative provides little help to the Supreme Court
because losing litigants will inevitably petition the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, inherent in the current proposals for a
national court is a basic oversight. Deciding a case on a national level seldom resolves conflicts so as to reduce litigation.
On the contrary, cases decided on a national level often result
in the proliferation of sub-issues causing even greater confusion and instability in the law. To paraphrase Aristotle, an inflexible and absolute rule will not have its intended effect in all
cases.
For example, the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Regents v. Roth 2 6 hardly served to be the final word on the due
process requirements in employment termination cases. Over
the past twenty-seven years, scores of cases have come before
the Court and distinguished Roth. Similarly, United States v.
Chadwick 27 was initially considered the definitive explanation
of the automobile exception in the context of warrantless
searches of luggage found in motor vehicles. Nonetheless, the
Court continues to hear numerous search and seizure cases
with varied facts and circumstances that can be distinguished
from Chadwick. This same pattern can be found in almost every
major decision the Court passes upon.
It is difficult to escape the fourth tier concept. Seven or nine
judges on a national court of appeals cannot have insight or be
more correct on a given issue than a three judge or an en banc
panel hearing of a matter by the court of appeals. A proposal
which merely involves changing personalities and changing
numbers will in fact be counterproductive to solving the
Court's workload problems. My friend Luther Swygert, a late,
great chief judge of the Seventh Circuit, believed that the national court of appeals "is a solution looking for a problem."
His basic point was not so much that a problem does not exist;
rather, he felt that the various proposals did not in any way
28
attack the problem.
If one views the increasing number of petitions for certiorari
which has created the problem, certainly the national court of
appeals as an intermediate court could not in any way alleviate
26. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
27. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
28. See Swygert, The ProposedNational Court of Appeals: A Threat toJudicial Symmetry,
51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976).
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the Supreme Court's growing burden. There is no question
that every time the national court of appeals would decide a
problem the losing litigant, just as he or she does today, would
petition for certiorari from the Supreme Court. Moreover, if
there was some kind of reference jurisdiction involved with the
national court of appeals, then the Court would have to look at
many matters twice. Thus, instead of alleviating the workload
problems, the proposed intermediate court would actually increase the number of petitions for certiorari that the Court
would have to process.
Moreover, there is already so much delay in the litigation
process at the present time that it will not serve the public to
build more procedural processes within the system. The public is not interested in the procedural mechanics of the law.
They are interested in a final decision. Litigants need to know
whether they have won or lost. But the decision in a given case
is often not the right decision until the final court has acted.
On this very date I am working on an opinion involving a prisoner who claims he has been unconstitutionally denied proper
medical treatment. The case began in 1984. It was decided by
the district court in 1988. It will be decided by our court in
1989. If it goes to the Supreme Court of the United States, it
might be 1990 or 1991 before the matter is resolved. In another case currently before our court, the complaint was filed
in 1986 and the defendants' motions for summary judgment
were granted in 1988. On appeal, we have raised sua sponte the
issue of whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a number
of the defendants. Obviously, if there is no jurisdiction, this
case which is in its fourth year in federal court must be dismissed. If we were to dismiss the case on jurisdictional
grounds and the litigants were to appeal this decision to the
Supreme Court, this issue alone would not be finally disposed
of until the early 1990s.
These cases demonstrate the rule rather than the exception
of the kind of delay that currently exists in our litigation arena.
Of course it is important to be right, and of course it is important to have quality analysis. But it is equally and sometimes
more important to simply make a decision on a given matter.
If the courts do not concentrate on trying to provide expeditious results and decisions, we risk losing the faith and support
of the American people. This is perhaps the most important
argument against a fourth tier being built into any appellate
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/2
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process through the creation of a national court of appeals that
is simply another intermediate level.
A worthwhile proposal for structural changes must necessarily involve a means of diverting a large percentage of the petitions for certiorari made to the Supreme Court. I would
propose that the Court redefine its jurisdiction concerning petitions for certiorari. Today, under its present Rule 17, the
Supreme Court may entertain petitions for certiorari in the following areas:
.1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right,
but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only when
there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the
Court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will
be considered.
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a
decision in conflict with the decision of another federal
court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided a
federal question in a way in conflict with a state court of
last resort; or has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course ofjudicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for
an exercise of this Court's power of supervision.
(b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with the decision of
another state court of last resort or of a federal court of
appeals.
(c) When a state court or a federal court of appeals
has decided an important question of federal law which
has not been, but should be, settled by this court, or
has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with
applicable decisions of this Court.
.2. The same general considerations outlined above will
control in respect of petitions for writs of certiorari to review judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the United States Court of Military Appeals, and of any other court whose judgments are review29
able by law on writ of certiorari.
By redefining the jurisdictional parameters of the Supreme
Court to include only those cases which involve an interpretation of the United States Constitution, United States Statutes,
or Federal Rules of Criminal or Civil Procedure, there would
29. SuP. CT. R. 17.
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be a radical reduction of the number of certiorari petitions the
Court must review while retaining jurisdiction to address all of
the issues that truly involve the national interest. This sort of
jurisdictional reform would mean that in most instances substantive review of agency decisions, diversity cases, and other
non-public issues would achieve finality through the decisions
of the United States Courts of Appeals. I think this is a sensible proposal which would reduce the workload of the Supreme
Court and provide a more logical and realistic dimension to
the workload problem created by the large number of certiorari petitions currently filed with the Supreme Court.
Where courts of appeals rule on agency decisions or other
important areas of litigation by conflicting decisions, a new
form of certiorari procedure could be developed to finally resolve these issues while avoiding the problems of a fourth tier
concept. A seven judge national court of appeals could be created, and the certiorari procedure could allow the litigant the
option of petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States
or the new national court of appeals for final determination of
a given matter. It would be mandatory under this proposal to
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States in all cases in which the Constitution or a federal statute
or rule is involved. The alternative national court simply
would not have certiorari jurisdiction in those areas. In all
other cases, however, litigants could petition to the national
court of appeals on a certiorari basis and that court could
either grant or deny certiorari. In the event that the national
court granted certiorari, whatever decision that court reached
would be the final decision and no petition for certiorari would
lie with the Supreme Court. Conversely, if the petition for certiorari is denied, then a similar bar would prevail and there
would be no other petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
available to the parties. In essence, this proposal would create
an optional forum for a party to petition for certiorari without
creating a fourth tier of review.
One might question whether litigants would have any incentive to seek review by the proposed national court of appeals if
petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for review
remains an available alternative. In reflecting on this issue,
one must consider where the litigant is more likely to receive
certiorari review. Because the alternative national court would
have a smaller volume of work than the Supreme Court, there
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol15/iss3/2
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would be a greater likelihood that the national court of appeals
would grant certiorari and hear an appeal. In other words, the
opportunity for review of the average appeal would be enhanced by filing a petition for certiorari with the national court
rather than with the Supreme Court. At the same time, structuring a national court of appeals in this way would provide the
Supreme Court with greater capacity to consider cases which
have national importance, such as those that relate to federal
constitutional and statutory issues, while also providing a way
for the Court to lighten its certiorari petition workload. Structurally, however, the federal judicial system would remain basically unchanged. There would still be just a single level of
permissive review above the courts of appeals.
The process of appointment of judges to this national court
is incidental to the purposes of lightening the certiorari load of
the Supreme Court and providing the Court with a greater capacity to hear important cases. Under this proposal, these
goals could be accomplished without the fears and problems
that accompany the fourth tier concept.
II.

THE COURTS OF APPEALS

A.

Circuit Division

In 1933, when Frankfurter commented on the growth of the
number of petitions for certiorari filed with the Supreme
Court, there were 3105 cases filed in the federal courts of appeals. 30 In 1988, over half a century later, we find over 37,000
appeals filed with federal circuit courts. 3 ' Of course in 1933
there were only forty-five judgeships in the United States as
compared to 168 active and nearly fifty senior circuit judges
today. 32 This increase has been most prominent in the last
twenty-three years since I have been on the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit. In 1966 when I came on the court there
were only eighty-eight circuit judgeships.3 3 Based upon the
growth projections of the docket contributed by Circuit Judge
Wallace, by the year 2000 there will be an increase of 119% in
.

30.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

FISCAL YEAR 1933 132.
31. 1988 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 3, at 1-7, 140.
32. Id. at 50.
33.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES COURTS

79 (1966).
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the present number of circuit judges. 34 While this figure is
astonishing, it is not unrealistic. The past has truly been a prologue to the future in the area of workload and court
expansion.
Today, there are thirteen courts of appeals in this country
including the eleven numbered circuit courts of appeals, the
D.C. Circuit, and the new Federal Court of Appeals. The
number of judges on the circuits range from six on the First
Circuit up to twenty-eight on the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit, by far the largest, has raised a good deal of concern as to
whether it has become too large. Its size has been defended by
former Chief Judge James Browning and many of the other
judges of the Ninth Circuit. That court has divided itself up
into regional courts and seems to be capable of dealing with its
size.3 5 Nevertheless the Fifth Circuit, which experienced simi-

lar growth and was eventually divided into the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits some ten years ago, is an example of how a circuit can be effectively divided. Of course the Eighth Circuit
experienced a similar transformation in 1929 when it was divided into the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. One unique problem relating to any proposed division of the Ninth Circuit,
however, is the fact that California is the largest state in the
nation and, of course, provides the greatest number of appeals. It has been deemed improvident to have one circuit
court include only one state. But there is the alternative problem of attempting to divide California into two different
circuits.
If we accept present numerical projections, and if we decide
to follow our previous course of creating additional circuits as
growth requires, we could conceivably have over twenty different circuit courts of appeals in the near future. This would
present incredible problems to the Supreme Court in terms of
the probability of conflicts within the circuits. An alternative to
increasing the number of circuits would be to double the
number ofjudges in each of the circuits. This latter approach,
which appears to be the strategy which Congress presently is
prone to follow, would similarly aggravate rather than solve
the problem by turning each circuit into an unwieldy and uncoordinated body of judges.
34. See supra note 6, at 228 nn.3-4.
35. 9TH CIR. R. 23. '
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There is no question that while an increase in the number of
circuit judges is the easy answer, without internal structural
changes it certainly is not the best answer. If faced with the
prospect of fifty-six judges rather than the present twentyeight, perhaps even the judges of the Ninth Circuit would
agree that there are severe problems involved with increasing
the number ofjudges within a given circuit. The growth of the
number ofjudges in a circuit court makes it difficult to achieve
a reasonable degree of predictability and creates problems of
collegiality. In my own circuit, which presently has ten judges,
there is a proposal to add two more judges in the next two to
five years. I have for some time expressed concerns that we
have already lost the necessary measure of predictability of the
court by increasing the number beyond nine. Of course, there
is no magic in the number nine. It has, however, served the
Supreme Court of the United States well for a long time. Furthermore, keeping the unit number small provides a much better situation for the law to grow in a more organized and
predictable manner.
Nonetheless some growth in the number of authorized circuit judgeships is inevitable: To deal with this dilemma, we
might follow the lead of former Chief Judge Browning in the
Ninth Circuit and apportion the responsibility of the workload
to regional courts within the circuit. Taking my own circuit for
example, and supposing that we had twenty judges on the
court rather than the present ten, the court could be structured
in such a way as to divide the responsibility for the northern
states and southern states by having nine judges in a southern
district, nine judges in a northern district, and two judges who
would sit at large. The judges could either rotate after serving
three to five year terms or stay within their assigned district.
Thus, despite the increase in the number ofjudges, the circuit
would preserve its stability because there generally would be
three panels of the same judges serving the northern section
and three panels of the same judges serving the southern
section.
Thus, rather than increasing the number of circuit courts, I
would propose that we work on a principle to subdivide each
circuit into divisional courts with judges specifically designated
to sit in each division. Moreover, we should attempt to keep
the number of active judges participating in each divisional
court to nine as the optimum size.
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1989
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En Banc Proceedings

In accord with the above suggestion, the rules governing en
banc procedures would have to be drastically altered to provide
uniformity and to lessen the chance of circuit splits. Today,
with the increased number of new judges on the courts of appeals, there has been an increase in en banc proceedings. My
own circuit is a good example of this trend. Before I came on
the court in 1966, I argued one of only two en banc cases heard
by the Eighth Circuit between 1956 and 1966.36 The history of
the other circuits is almost identical. Indeed, from 1966 to
1980, there were very few en banc cases. However, with the
change of administrations and the appointment of more judges
on the courts of appeals, the newer judges have demonstrated
their desire to hear more cases en banc.
Many chief judges of the various circuits echo my observation that many of the newer judges in each circuit want to have
an immediate expanded voice in the decision-making process.
Consequently, these judges have a tendency to vote to hear
cases en banc that depend solely upon a question of the exercise
of judgment rather than a question of law. Indeed, many of
the en banc cases do not deserve to be reheard by all of the
judges in the circuit.3 7 These issues include whether there is
prejudicial error in a given case, whether the trial court abused
its discretion, whether the panel correctly applied state law,
and whether in a criminal case there was harmless error.
These are questions that seldom if ever should require the full
attention and energies of a court en banc. The Supreme Court
has declared that suggestions for rehearing en banc should be
entertained by the court not in terms of "the correctness" of
the particular decision, but solely on the "significance" of the
case.3 81 This factor has generally been overlooked in the recent
increase of en banc hearings throughout most of the circuit
courts of appeals. There is no question that the time and expense involved in bringing ten or more judges together to hear
one case over again should mandate that en banc review be a
rare event. In fact, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
36. McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1965). See also Bailey
v. Henslee, 309 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1962).
37. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C.L. REV. 29, 61-69 (1988).
38. See Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. Ry., 345 U.S. 247, 262-63
(1953).
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require that a case be of exceptional importance if it is to be
heard en banc.39 This does not, however, deter the attorneys
from suggesting en banc review in about ten percent of the
cases decided by a panel. It also does not deter the majority of
judges from voting to grant en banc review in a given case which
is fact specific and should not require the resources necessary
for consideration by all the circuit's judges.
The courts of appeals are already burdened with a heavy
workload, and the time it takes the full court to read briefs,
hear argument, and repeat the same deliberative process performed by the panel is extensive. The delay which accompanies en banc cases is apparent in the fact that, notwithstanding
our own policy to try to expedite deliberation and dispose of
all cases in ninety days, 40 some of the en banc cases take over a
year to reach final disposition. These cases needlessly go
through the appellate system twice and, because it takes longer
for ten judges to make up their mind than it does for three
judges, the time necessary for final determination invariably
exceeds the limits of reasonable delay.
Even if the circuits are not restructured, I would hope that
the federal judiciary committee recommends rigid limitations
on the use of en banc procedures. In my judgment, en banc consideration is justified only when there is a question of intra- or
inter-circuit conflict on significant issues. In any event, if we
follow former Chief Judge Browning's example in the Ninth
Circuit to make divisions within each circuit, the number of circuits could remain the same and local or national rules could
be enacted to require only nine judges on an en banc panel regardless of the size of the circuit. 4 1 This nine judge panel
could be set up on a rotational basis with each judge in the
circuit serving for an equal period. In this manner, even
though our projected growth would give the Eighth Circuit
one of the larger circuits in terms of number of judges on a
federal court of appeals, these procedures would ensure effective self-policing so as to maintain consistency in the circuit's
decisions.
39. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).

40.

INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT VI(A).

41. Cf 9TH CIR. R. 25. See also Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings:A
Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (1986).
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The Permissive Appeal

Another effective, albeit controversial, modification to reduce the workload and lessen the need to increase the number
of judges would be to limit the right of the litigant to come to
the court. In other words, this proposal would change the rule
of appeal as a matter of right to a rule where there is appeal on
a permissive basis. 4 2 In order to accommodate many of the

objections that have been made to this type of proposal, I must
state at the outset that not all cases should be subject to permissive appeal. For instance, a right of appeal must exist in all
criminal cases. I would further propose to handle all civil appeals as we do today in cases involving habeas corpus and in
forma pauperis 43 by having some preliminary review by the
district court and the court of appeals as to whether a certificate of probable cause or leave to appeal should issue. I think
that generally the burden should be on the district court in
each instance to certify whether an appeal in a civil case should
be taken, much in the same manner that the district court reviews petitions for certificate of probable cause and certificate
of good faith related to in forma pauperis appeals. 44 If the certificate is denied by the district court, then as in habeas corpus
cases, application can be made in the court of appeals. If the
petition is denied, then the court of appeals should issue an
order to show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed. In many instances appeals are taken in civil matters
that relate to evidence and instructions which seldom carry
prejudicial error. These cases could be singled out through a
very narrow preliminary basis and the merit of the appeal
judged rather quickly.
There is another proposal originated by the late Judge
Albert Bryan of the Fourth Circuit. Years ago he wrote an article suggesting that, following trial, litigants who wish to appeal
should file notice and request to have oral argument within
thirty days of that filing. Notice would simply include a statement of the issues and no briefs would be required since the
trial briefs would contain the law. 4 5 In most appeals, there is
42. Lay, A Proposalfor Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34 Sw. L.J.
1151, 1155-58 (1981).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982).
44. See also FED. R. App. P. 24.
45. Bryan, ForA Swifter CriminalAppeal-To Protect The Public As Well As The Accused,
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no need to have a complete written transcript. The parties can
state the facts and, if there is disagreement, the court of appeals could certify to the district court reporter to have that
particular portion of the transcript sent to the court so as to
resolve the factual differences. In most cases, parties will be
able to adequately argue on appeal immediately after trial because the record and arguments will be fresh in the minds of
both counsel. Additionally, the case retains its momentum and
the appeal process in most cases could be terminated within a
46
reasonable time after the trial.
Most appeal issues that arise in civil cases involve such matters as whether the court has applied the state law correctly,
erred on instructions, improperly admitted evidence, or incorrectly ruled on pleading questions. These are issues that could
be most easily dealt with shortly after trial. Under Judge
Bryan's proposal, appeals could be disposed of quickly and
economically.
Because of limitations of time and space, I have not addressed the workload problems of the district courts. However, solutions and changes within the district courts directly
affect the courts of appeals. Therefore, I must offer a word of
concern: while it is easy to reduce workload by cutting back our
subject matter jurisdiction of cases, we need to proceed cautiously in this area. Ourjudicial structure must continue to adjust to meet the expanded needs caused by the growth of the
law and ensure the fair adjudication of human rights. Arbitrarily slashing areas of subject matter jurisdiction may very well
be counter to these objectives.
Whatever transpires in the next twenty-five years, we need to
act carefully. Once structural changes in an institution take
place, it is difficult to turn back. Nonetheless change, even if it
comes slowly, will come. In the meantime, our collective concern should help those who chart the course.
25 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 175, 182-83 (1968). See also 1975 Hearings on Federal Court
Appellate System, supra note 24, at 902 (testimony of the Honorable Donald P. Lay,
Chief Judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals).
46. Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 UCLA L. REV.

419, 424-26 (1976).
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